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Abstract
A number of judge-made doctrines attempt to promote international comity by
reducing possible tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns. For
example, ambiguous statutes are usually interpreted to conform to international law, and
statutes are usually not understood to apply outside of the nation’s territorial boundaries.
The international comity doctrines are best understood as a product of a judicial
judgment that in various settings, the costs of American deference to foreign interests are
less than the benefits to American interests. Sometimes Congress balances these
considerations and incorporates its judgment in a statute, but usually it does not. In such
cases, executive interpretations should be permitted to trump the comity doctrines. This
conclusion is supported both by considerations of institutional competence and by the
distinctive position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs. It follows that if the
executive wants to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to apply extraterritorially, or so as
to conflict with international law, it should be permitted to do so. The analysis of the
interpretive power of the executive follows by reference to the Chevron doctrine in
administrative law, which similarly calls for deference to executive interpretation of
statutory ambiguities. Sometimes the Chevron doctrine literally applies to executive
interpretations; sometimes it operates as a valuable analogy.
I. Introduction
Federal law contains a range of international comity doctrines, developed by
judges in order to reduce tensions between the United States and other nations. These
doctrines instruct courts to interpret American law in a way that avoids conflict with, or
offense to, foreign sovereigns. The international comity doctrines are a subset of what we
shall call international relations doctrines—doctrines that control how courts decide cases
that influence foreign relations but that do not always require courts to defer to the
interests of foreign sovereigns. Our modest goal here is to offer a sympathetic
reconstruction of the underpinnings of these doctrines. Our more ambitious goal is to
suggest that in the current period, courts should permit executive interpretations of
ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international relations doctrines. This
approach would greatly simplify current law; it would also allocate authority to those in
the best position to balance the competing interests.
*
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To understand the operation of the international relations doctrines, consider the
following cases:
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of sex.1
American businesses are operating in Saudi Arabia; they discriminate against
female workers, who are also Americans. The workers bring suit, contending
that the statute has been violated. Under the presumption against
extraterritoriality, ambiguous statutes are not applied to conduct that occurs on
foreign territory.2 It follows that unless Congress has clearly said otherwise,
the prohibition on sex discrimination applies only within the physical
boundaries of the United States.3 The usual rationale, applied here, would be
to prevent offense to Saudi Arabia. But does Saudi Arabia really care about
sex discrimination by American businesses practiced against American
employees? Even if it does, does it care enough that the discriminatory
practice should be tolerated? The executive branch, which has the best
information about relations with Saudi Arabia, says no.4 Should courts defer
to the executive?
2. The Immigration and Naturalization Act authorizes the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to detain dangerous aliens who cannot be
repatriated because their home countries will not accept them. The INS
interprets this authorization as permitting it to hold an alien convicted of
manslaughter for an indefinite period. The alien brings suit, arguing that the
INS has violated the statute, which is unclear on the particular question. Under
the Charming Betsy doctrine, which requires courts to construe ambiguous
statutes so as not to violate international law, the immigration statute should
not be interpreted to permit “prolonged and arbitrary” detention, which
violates international human rights law.5 The executive branch, which has
good information about the consequences of violating international law,
argues against use of the Charming Betsy doctrine. Should courts defer to the
executive?
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally forbids lawsuits
against foreign sovereigns in American courts, but it contains a number of
exceptions, one of which permits suits in cases of expropriations of property
in violation of international law. A plaintiff sues Austria, arguing that it
expropriated art works that belonged to her family during and after World
War II. Prior to enactment of the FSIA in 1976, the judge-made foreign
sovereign immunity doctrine did not contain an exception for illegal
1

42 USC 2000(e)(2).
See Small v. United States, 544 US 385 (2005).
3
EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The actual case involved discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, and national origin.
4
Cf. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 124 S Ct 2169 (2005) (involving application of Americans
With Disabilities Act to foreign-flagged ships, urged by the executive branch).
5
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
2
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expropriations. The executive branch argues that the FSIA should not apply
retroactively, apparently because it fears that litigation would upset delicate
international arrangements to provide compensation of victims of Nazi
oppression where necessary. Should the court accept the interpretation of the
executive branch?6
Each of these examples raises two questions. The first involves the operation of
the international relations doctrines. Why, exactly, should courts assume that statutes
should be interpreted to avoid extraterritorial application (as in the first example) and
violations of international law (as in the second example)? The conventional explanation
is that otherwise foreign sovereigns will be offended, but neither of our first two
examples provides a strong case for such a view.7 Indeed, the third example is a case in
which the Supreme Court was willing to risk offending a foreign sovereign in order to
vindicate another, competing principle. We will argue that the international relations
doctrines are best understood by reference to an account that emphasizes the costs of
deferring to foreign interests, which may be substantial, as well as the benefits. As we
shall show, important American interests may justify giving offense to foreign
sovereigns, including, for example, the interests in vindicating laws forbidding
discrimination and protecting environmental harm and endangered species.8
The second question involves the role of the executive. When the executive
advances an interpretation of a statute that violates international comity doctrines (the
first two examples) or otherwise places a strain on the ordinary meaning of a statute (the
third example), should the executive’s interpretation be entitled to respect? This question
has not yet been answered by the courts. Drawing an analogy to the Chevron doctrine in
6

Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).
The literature on the international comity doctrines is too large to cite here, but in any event it is
overwhelmingly doctrinal and historical, not theoretical. On comity itself, see, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in
International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1991) (arguing that the discretionary use of comity is a means by
which courts balance domestic and foreign interests); Michael Ramsey, Escaping International Comity, 83
Iowa L. Rev. 893 (1998) (exploring uses and limits of comity principles). On the Charming Betsy canon,
see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479 (1998) (arguing that the canon should be used by
courts to determine the intent of the political branches). On extraterritoriality, see, e.g., Larry Kramer,
Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179 (1991) (objecting
that the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the presumption of extraterritoriality is outdated). On the
act of state doctrine, see, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39
Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1998) (arguing that courts have unnecessarily applied the doctrine broadly to investment
contracts with foreign governments); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1907 (1992) (noting the difference in
application of the doctrine to liberal and nonliberal states, finding liberal states sometimes are subject to
more stringent evaluation). On the Foreign Sovereign Immunities act, see, e.g. Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations ch. 7 (2d ed. 2003). We will cite other sources, infra.
8
See, e.g., EDF v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the National Environmental Policy
Act to apply extraterritorially, at least to Antarctica, even in the face of claim that application of NEPA
would violate the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty); Born Free USA v. Norton,
278 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C 2003) (refusing to apply NEPA extraterritorially to protect wild elephants in
Swaziland); NRDC v. US Department of the Navy, 2002 US Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (accepting
regulation applying Endangered Species Act to the high seas, even outside of the United States)
7
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administrative law,9 and arguing that often Chevron applies directly, we contend that
courts should defer to the executive on the ground that the resolution of ambiguities
requires judgments of policy and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of the
executive places it in the best position to make those judgments.
The importance of the international relations doctrines has been growing over
time, a consequence of the increasing frequency of cross-border activity and the
corresponding efforts of the U.S. government to regulate that activity. At one time, the
U.S. government was not intensely concerned about conduct on foreign soil, because
such conduct had little or no impact on the well-being of American citizens. Today, the
U.S. government often does care about that conduct. One reason is that foreign firms
produce goods that compete in the world market with goods produced in the United
States, and hence the conduct of foreign businesses might greatly affect American
workers and consumers. Antitrust law can be used against foreign businesses to ensure
that they do not engage in anticompetitive practices that injure Americans.10 To say the
least, American citizens have a strong interest in freedom from sex discrimination, but
application of American law to actions in (say) Saudi Arabia or Iraq might well cause
international tensions. Americans also care about whether foreign sovereigns adequately
investigate and prosecute international terrorists who plot on their soil but conduct
operations in the United States. All of these activities are potentially governed by the
international relations doctrines.
As we shall see, the doctrines have plausible justifications. Courts are alert to the
risks of creating international tensions, and in many cases they seem to be making a
presumptive judgment that to the United States, deferring to the interests of foreign
sovereigns can produce benefits for Americans that outweigh the costs. For this reason,
courts have concluded that that the national lawmaker must explicitly authorize
extraterritorial application of domestic law, or a violation of international law, or any
other decision that threatens international comity. But there are strong reasons, rooted in
constitutional understandings and in institutional competence, to allow the executive
branch to resolve issues of international comity, at least where the underlying statute is
unclear.11 Suppose that the executive branch interprets an antitrust statute, or the

9

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
U.S. antitrust litigation against foreign firms doing business on foreign soil has been a significant source
of international tension. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration 916-18 (3rd
ed. 2006). So have American discovery practices. See id.
11
Thus, we agree with Curtis Bradley’s conclusion that the Charming Betsy doctrine and the presumption
against extraterritoriality—two of the doctrines we discuss—should not prevail over Chevron deference.
See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649, 679 (2000) (courts
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes even if such interpretations may violate
international law). We also believe that Bradley correctly emphasizes the executive’s superior expertise in
foreign relations. But his argument and ours is different. Ours is theoretical and functional, albeit
influenced by constitutional constraints; his is predominantly doctrinal, focused on the source of law. Thus,
unlike us, he argues that Chevron deference is not appropriate for (for example) the act of state doctrine, a
doctrine of federal common law, because “there is no basis for presuming a delegation of lawmaking power
to the executive branch, and (unlike head-of-state immunity, for example) these doctrines are not based on
the executive branch’s independent lawmaking powers.” Id. at 716. Bradley also does not try to advance a
10
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Endangered Species Act, to apply abroad in violation of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The executive branch is in an exceedingly good position to balance the
relevant interests, and it can also claim a constitutional warrant for making the underlying
judgments in the face of congressional silence.
This simple argument fits with the logic of some recent decisions,12 but it also has
radical implications. The most obvious is that courts should play a smaller role in
interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations than they currently do. Another is that
the executive branch should be given greater power to decide whether the U.S. will
violate international law than it currently has. Yet another is that comity-related
ambiguities in any grant of power to the President, including an authorization to use
force, should be settled by the executive, even if international law is inconsistent with the
executive’s view. Our argument also implies greater deference to the executive when it
intervenes in private litigation. Under our approach, the international relations doctrines
would continue to resolve cases in which the executive has not taken a position. In such
cases, the default assumption would follow the established doctrines; an affirmative
statement by the executive would be necessary to overcome that assumption. But if such
a statement is forthcoming, and so long as it is reasonable, the courts would promote
comity, or reject comity, only to the extent that the executive wanted that result.
II.

International Relations Doctrines

Over a period of many years, courts have adopted numerous rules for litigation
that touches on the interests of foreign sovereigns or their citizens. These rules apply in
the absence of congressional guidance; the national legislature is permitted to settle the
underlying questions as it chooses. Most of these doctrines are specifically designed to
promote comity. Others, however, must be justified in other terms, because they promote
American interests at the expense of comity.
A. Comity Doctrines
Charming Betsy canon. The Charming Betsy canon provides that an ambiguous
statute will be interpreted so as to avoid conflicts with international law. Return to one of
cases with which we began: An ambiguous law that permits the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to detain an alien who cannot be repatriated will not be interpreted
as permitting indefinite detention, because such detention would violate the prohibition of
“prolonged and arbitrary” detention in international law.13
Extraterritoriality. The presumption against extraterritoriality provides that an
ambiguous statute will be interpreted not to apply to territory outside the United States.
theory of the international comity doctrines, as we do. Of course he was unable to explore the many recent
developments in the law governing judicial review of agency interpretations of law, traced below.
12
See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005), and in particular the
emphasis on “our customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs.” Id.
13
Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). The canon gets its name from Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (interpreting statute prohibiting trade with France so as not to
apply to citizen of neutral state, which would have violated international law of neutrality).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not explicitly say whether it applies abroad or not; it is
therefore interpreted not to apply to discriminatory behavior of American businesses
located in Saudi Arabia.14 It has similarly been held that the National Environmental
Policy Act, which is silent on the question of extraterritorial application, does not apply
abroad, and hence does not (for example) require an environmental impact statement for
U.S. military installations in Japan.15
Act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine provides that a court may not
evaluate the act of another state that takes place within its own territory. Shortly after the
Cuban revolution, the Cuban government expropriated sugar that belonged to an
American company. Another firm entered a contract with Cuba for the sugar, but refused
to pay for it after the sugar was delivered, fearing that it might be liable to the victim of
expropriation. Cuba sued the buyer for breach of contract in an American court, and the
buyer defended itself by arguing that Cuba did not have clear title to the sugar because
the expropriation was illegal. Under the act of state doctrine, the court may not accept
this argument because it would involve an evaluation of Cuba’s conduct; it must assume
that Cuba’s title is valid.16
Foreign sovereign immunity. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, according to which foreign
sovereigns are granted immunity from liability for violation of the law.17 The rule was
relaxed in the twentieth century, mainly in cases involving a commercial defendant
owned by a foreign sovereign.18 In 1976, the doctrine was codified in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act.19 Originally a judge-made doctrine, the idea of foreign
immunity is now governed by a statute that contains various exceptions that judge-made
law never recognized—for example, denying immunity to state sponsors of terrorism.20 A
related doctrine provides immunity to heads of state.21
Comity in general. Case law equivocates between calling international comity a
rule and a value. As a value, it reflects the sense that cases affecting foreign interests
should be decided in a manner that accounts for these interests in some way—hence our
reference to “international comity doctrines” in general. Courts sometimes cite
international comity as an explanation for outcomes that are not explicitly driven by the
doctrines we have discussed, and here comity is sometimes treated as a value.22 For
example, the Supreme Court cited international comity in explaining why courts should
14

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). We note below some complexities in this
decision and surrounding doctrine.
15
See NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C .1993); see also ARC Ecology v.
U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that CERCLA does not apply
extraterritorially to an American military base in the Philippines).
16
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
17
The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812),
18
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983) (discussing history).
19
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602.
20
Id., § 1605(a)(7).
21
Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004).
22
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (holding that antitrust
claims were properly arbitrated under the Arbitration Act).
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defer to the judgments of international arbitrators used to resolve international contractual
disputes.23 In a recent case, Justice Breyer cited concerns about international comity to
explain his uneasiness with application of the Alien Tort Statute to cases in which both
parties are aliens and the tortious conduct took place on foreign territory.24 Courts also
appeal to international comity to justify staying litigation in the United States when
parallel litigation exists in foreign countries.25 In these ways, comity operates as a
freestanding value that sometimes enters into the resolution of difficult cases.
Taken as a whole, this body of doctrines implies that courts should take seriously
the interests of foreign sovereigns, to the extent that domestic statutes are silent or
ambiguous on the issues, and even sometimes when domestic statutes are fairly clear. An
American court might offend foreign sovereigns by violating international law that
reflects their interests; by interfering with their regulation of activities on their territory;
by taking cases in whose resolution they have a strong interest; by judging their activities;
or by issuing judgments against them.
B. Anticomity Doctrines
Some international relations doctrines do not promote comity at all. On the
contrary, they sacrifice comity for the sake of American interests that are perceived as
important. We shall call these the “anticomity doctrines.”
The revenue rule. The revenue rule provides that an American court will not
enforce a tax judgment of another nation.26 Suppose that a Canadian or American citizen
fails to pay taxes in Canada. The defendant flees to the United States, and the Canadian
government brings suit in an American court, asking the court to enforce the Canadian
tax law or a judgment based on it. The revenue rule prohibits the American court from
enforcing the Canadian tax judgment. Note that the revenue rule is rooted in state rather
than federal law; notably, it has not been overridden at the national level, and in that
sense has received national acquiescence over time.
The penal rule. Under the penal rule, the American court is forbidden to enforce a
foreign criminal judgment.27 By contrast, an American court is generally supposed to
enforce other types of judgments—for example, breach of contract or tort—unless there
are public policy reasons not to do so.28 It should be clear that the revenue and penal rules
23

Id.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
25
See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D. Colo. 2000) (stay of
proceedings granted while litigation proceeded in London); Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744
F. Supp. 1215, 1236 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (stay of proceedings pending the outcome in the Japanese court); see
also Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Foundation
Agreement tribunal was better suited to resolve the dispute because it was more familiar with German law).
26
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 483 (1987) (“Courts in the United States are not required to
recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of
other states”).
27
Id.
28
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 481-82.
24
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do not show much respect for the interests of a foreign state—a problem, as we shall see,
for those who argue that international relations doctrines are supposed to prevent
entanglements. The penal rule, like the revenue rule, is rooted in state rather than federal
law.29
Public Policy Exceptions to Enforcement of Foreign Law and Judgments. The
revenue and penal rules aside, courts do enforce foreign private law judgments—for
example, judgments resulting from breaches of contract or torts—and also enforce
foreign private law when most of the events or transactions take place on foreign soil.30
And yet standard choice of law rules also contain a significant exception for judgments
and laws that violate American public policy. American courts refuse to enforce
judgments of countries that have corrupt or ineffective legal systems.31 They have also
refused to enforce foreign laws that offend American values or sensibilities—most
notably, British libel law, which is less protective of expression than the first amendment
allows in the United States.32 It follows that American courts will not uphold judgments
against defendants under British libel law, even if ordinary conflicts principles would call
for such liability.
These anticomity doctrines assert American interests in the context of
international relations, potentially or actually at the expense of the interests of other
countries. These doctrines are, to be sure, rules of state law, while the comity doctrines
are rules of federal law; nonetheless, the anticomity doctrines do determine legal
outcomes, and they are applied by federal courts in diversity cases. As we shall now see,
the existence of doctrines that jeopardize comity casts the international relations doctrines
in a distinctive light.
III. Behind the Doctrines
What underlies these various doctrines? It is tempting to suggest that they track
Congress’ own intentions. Perhaps Congress ordinarily expects and hopes that its
enactments will be interpreted conformably to international law. Perhaps Congress does
not want American law to be applied extraterritorially unless the legislature has said so
29

The revenue and penal rules are sometimes said to be examples of a more general “public law taboo”
against enforcing foreign public law or foreign judgments based on foreign public law in domestic courts.
See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 61 (2002); Philip J.
McConnaughay, Reviving the Public Law Taboo, 35 Stan. J. Int’l L. 255 (1999). Public law includes
antitrust law, securities law, and so forth; not just tax and criminal law. The public law taboo has been
breaking down, but still remains strong. Id. at 256-57.
30
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 481.
31
See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2nd Cir. 2000) (finding that civil war in Liberia
resulted in corrupt courts, subject to substantial factional pressure); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d
1406 (9th Cir. 1995) (strong anti-American bias, politicization, and secrecy in Iranian courts precluded the
possibility of a fair and impartial tribunal); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244 (3rd Cir. 1994) (lack of notice of a
South Korean entry of order of execution violated due process); Banco Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711 (Tex.
1915) (no real opportunity for defendant to be heard in Mexican courts, arbitrary denial of an appeal for
failure to stamp a document).
32
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (British
libel laws violate U.S. public policy because they conflict with First Amendment protections).
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explicitly. But this explanation seems highly artificial. Congress frequently enacts
statutes that violate international law, apply extraterritorially, or otherwise ignore notions
of comity.33 Perhaps Congress’ failure to take these steps explicitly signals its acceptance
of the outcomes produced by the comity doctrines. But when a statute is silent about
these issues, Congress is most unlikely to have any intentions or even to have thought
about the question at all. The comity doctrines are not easily justified as a mere mirror of
congressional instructions. If there is affirmative evidence, in context, that Congress
endorses the outcomes indicated by comity, it might be reasonable to speak confidently
about Congress’ intentions; but in the cases that we are discussing, no such evidence can
be found.34
On an alternative view, the doctrines track congressional intentions only because
they provide the background against which Congress legislates.35 To the extent that some
of the doctrines are clear and firm – consider the presumption against extraterritoriality –
Congress might be assumed to want them to apply unless it legislates otherwise. In a
sense, the doctrines are incorporated by implicit reference. As with the canon against
retroactivity,36 so too with the comity doctrines: They are part of the fabric of existing
law, and Congress is best taken to endorse them unless it expressly displaces them.
In our view, this position also suffers from a lack of realism. It is true that the
doctrines are part of the “background” in the sense that they are invoked by courts in the
face of congressional silence. But is it plausible to say that Congress, as such, should be
charged with endorsing them, or even with knowing what they are? Perhaps particular
legislators, and members of relevant interest groups, are aware of the doctrines. But there
is a large distance between signaling this possibility and suggesting that Congress should
be understood to have endorsed the doctrines as part of the background against which it
does its work. The real basis for the international relations doctrines must be normative; it
must be that they ought to be taken as part of the legislative background, not that
Congress does so take them.
The most common explanation for international comity doctrines is that they
avoid unnecessary tensions, or entanglements, with foreign states.37 We now evaluate this

33

E.g., Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006) (Act of State doctrine shall not
be used to decline jurisdiction over property confiscation violating international law after Jan. 1, 1959);
Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 6021-6091 (2006) (mandating the Cuban embargo remain in place until
a change in government occurs).
34
See, e.g., EDF v. Masset, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing extraterritorial application of NEPA
without being able to identify evidence of congressional intentions).
35
This view is endorsed in NEPA Coalition v. Aspen, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993) (assuming that
Congress legislates with awareness of presumption against extraterritoriality); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
36
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
37
See Duncan Hollis, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 881 (2005) (citing Justice
Scalia’s interpretation of comity as a means of preventing foreign conflict); Molly Warner Lien, The
Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial Comity, 50 Cath. U.L. Rev. 591 (2001)
(arguing cooperative comity helps to minimize conflicts with foreign courts); Harold Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International
Law, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 280 (1982) (suggesting that courts cite comity as helping to preserve international
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conventional wisdom, which we will call the entanglement theory. We will argue that it is
inferior to a broader theory, which we will call the consequentialist theory. This theory,
we suggest, helps explain those principles that require a clear congressional judgment on
certain questions.38 It is important to try to understand the underpinnings of the doctrines,
and such an understanding is one of our central goals; but as we shall see, the argument
for deference to executive interpretations follows on either account.
A. Entanglement
The entanglement theory says that international comity doctrines reduce the risk
that courts will inadvertently cause foreign policy tensions or crises by offending other
nations. Courts have made this argument about all of the comity doctrines described
above. The act of state doctrine prevents courts from angering foreign sovereigns by
expressing disapproval of their sovereign acts.39 The FSIA similarly prevents courts from
declaring that a foreign sovereign has violated an American law that the foreign
government regards as an insult to its sovereignty.40 The presumption against
extraterritoriality prevents courts from interfering with the ability of foreign governments
to regulate activity on their own soil,41 in a way that threatens to create international
conflict.42 The common theme is that a court might inadvertently increase international
tensions, or in the extreme case even provoke an international crisis, by offending or
injuring a foreign nation, which then might retaliate against the United States by
withdrawing its participation in a vital area of international cooperation or directing its
own courts to commit similar offenses against the United States.
To be sure, the comity doctrines are default rules only; courts will not interfere
with a legislative determination that America’s interests are advanced despite (or because
of) the international conflict. But because, all else equal, foreign conflict is bad rather
than good, courts will assume that it does not serve America’s interests unless Congress
explicitly says otherwise.
In our view, the theory is superficially attractive but ultimately unpersuasive,
certainly as an account of the international relations doctrines taken as a whole. The
problem with the theory is that it identifies the benefits of deferring to foreign sovereigns
(avoiding offense, retaliation, conflict), but it does not account for the costs of deferring
to foreign sovereigns (preventing the U.S. from advancing its interests, including the goal
relations and encouraging efficiency in the resolution of disputes through discretionary cooperation
between foreign courts).
38
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of protecting American citizens from antidiscrimination, or preventing the loss of
endangered species or some other kind of serious environmental harm). Thus, it implies,
implausibly, that courts should always defer, which they do not.
An evident difficulty is that the anticomity rules flatly contradict the theory. The
public policy exception to the choice of law rules permits the court to refuse to enforce a
foreign judgment or foreign law if it violates American public policy. In order to apply
this rule, the court must evaluate the sovereign act of a foreign country against American
policies. In addition, the revenue and penal rules prohibit courts from enforcing foreign
laws and judgments, in a way that is more likely to increase than to decrease international
tensions. Strikingly, courts have argued that the revenue and penal rules advance
international comity by preventing courts from evaluating foreign tax and criminal laws
case by case.43 But this argument does not bear scrutiny. One would more
straightforwardly avoid offending foreign sovereigns by enforcing their revenue and
penal laws than by refusing to enforce them. Indeed, this is the theory of the act of state
doctrine.
In addition, numerous exceptions to the FSIA permit courts (among other things)
to evaluate the conduct of foreign sovereigns when they engage in commercial and other
activities.44 And the Charming Betsy canon requires courts to determine what
international law is, and such a determination will often require a court to evaluate the
acts of foreign states—for example, whether they have really consented to a norm of
customary international law or not. Might not foreign sovereigns be offended when
American courts hold that their laws violate public policy, or refuse to enforce their tax
judgments and fines, or decline to grant them immunity, or reject their claim that some
norm of international law exists? These judgments will frequently trouble foreign
sovereigns, potentially leading to foreign policy tensions that will need to be resolved.
None of this means that the avoidance of foreign entanglements plays no role in
existing doctrine. As we mentioned, a foreign entanglement—more accurately, causing
offense to a foreign state—is a real cost. Consider, for example, an effort to invoke the
National Environmental Policy Act to block a joint United States-Russian plan for the
transportation of nuclear material—an effort that, if successful, might cause serious
tensions with Russia.45 Gratuitous tensions with other nations should certainly be
avoided. But sometimes tensions are not gratuitous, and the use of the comity principles
can inflict harm on legitimate American interests as well. If a statute is interpreted so as
to conform to international law, such interests may be thwarted, in a way that harms
American citizens. The failure to apply overseas the antitrust laws, the antidiscrimination
laws, or the environmental laws may mean real injury to American citizens. Perhaps
some of the doctrines represent a categorical judgment that the risk of international
43
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tension outweighs that injury, at least enough so to require a clear statement from
Congress. But an analysis of this sort leads in directions that the entanglement theory,
standing by itself, cannot explain.
In sum, the problem with the entanglement theory is that entanglements are not
always bad, the theory provides no basis for distinguishing good or tolerable
entanglements from bad entanglements, and (most important) the theory says nothing
about the benefits for American interests that might outweigh the cost of entanglements.
Taken literally, the entanglement theory suggests that courts should interpret statutes and
common law rules so as always to defer to foreign sovereigns, but courts clearly do not
do this. A better theory would explain why courts sometimes defer to foreign interests
because of the risk of entanglement and sometimes refuse to defer to such interests
despite the risk of entanglement.
A more refined understanding of the entanglement theory might emphasize an
institutional point, involving the need for express congressional authorization of courses
of action that threaten to create tensions with other nations. Without express
authorization, courts ought not to take steps that threaten to produce international
conflicts; accidental or inadvertent conflicts should be avoided. The idea is not that
Congress seeks to avoid entanglements, but that if it has not expressed its will clearly,
entanglements should be avoided. If they are to occur, it must be because the national
legislature has specifically authorized them.
This idea is appealing in the abstract. But for the reasons just stated, an insistence
on legislative authorization cannot account for all of the international relations doctrines.
Some of them operate so as to offend foreign sovereigns, even in the face of legislative
silence. As we have said, international tensions are undesirable, but it may make sense to
increase the risk of such tensions if doing so promotes important social values (domestic
and international). Suppose, for example, that extraterritorial application of the National
Environmental Policy Act, so as to govern environmentally sensitive decisions by the
United States abroad, could possibly irritate other sovereigns—but at the same time
would reduce the likelihood of serious environmental harm.46 Is it so clear that NEPA,
which is ambiguous on the question of extraterritoriality, should be interpreted in a way
that requires an unambiguous congressional statement in order to apply abroad? In our
view, the answer is not so clear, which suggests that the underlying explanation for the
doctrines must lie elsewhere.
B. Consequences and Reciprocity
A more complete explanation is that courts defer to foreign sovereigns after a
rough assessment of the consequences. Deference occurs when courts believe that the
benefits of deference exceed the costs. With this formulation, we do not mean a formal
cost-benefit analysis, which would of course be impossible in the circumstances; the
point is instead that the doctrines are best understood as rooted in an all-things46
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considered assessment of consequences, which importantly include the legitimacy and
strength of the American interests in violating the ordinary requirements of comity.
The costs of deference include the loss of American control over activities whose
regulation would promote American interests – not simply those of the United States as
sovereign, but also those of American citizens in ensuring fidelity to the principles
embodied in American law. The benefits of deference include the reciprocal gains from
deference, on the part of foreign states, to American regulation and also the reduced
likelihood of causing international tensions, which could ultimately hurt American
interests. The benefits will, of course, be obtained only if the foreign sovereign actually
reciprocates or if the risk of such tensions is real. Thus, deference is based on two factors:
(1) an empirical determination or conjecture (a) that the foreign state is likely to
reciprocate or (b) that it would otherwise retaliate in some way; and (2) a judgment that
the benefits of reciprocation or nonretaliation by foreign states exceed the cost of
deference by the United States. In our view, intuitive judgments with respect to (1) and
(2) help to explain the operation of the international relations doctrines, and some
incongruities as well. Our goal in this section is to defend this claim, both as a way of
understanding the doctrines and as a general preface to the inquiry into executive
authority to displace them.
To see how this consequentialist theory works, consider first the penal rule. The
cost of deference to a foreign criminal judgment is that the American court may end up
imposing a sanction on a person on account of a crime that the U.S. does not recognize as
serious, or of a criminal conviction that emerged from procedures that the U.S. does not
recognize as just. If the defendant is not an American citizen, that cost might not be
deemed especially large; but surely the United States is interested in avoiding the use of
its courts to collaborate in injustice. If the defendant is an American citizen, then the cost
will be that much larger. The benefit of deference is that if foreign states reciprocate,
people convicted in American courts who flee to foreign jurisdictions will be forced to
pay the American fine; thus, American criminal enforcement is strengthened. The penal
rule is best understood as reflecting American uneasiness with foreign criminal
procedures, in which traditional American criminal protections against unjust
convictions, including the jury, are often absent.47 To avoid enforcing foreign
convictions, the U.S. is willing to give up enforcement of American convictions abroad.
Other nations appear to hold similar views.48 Indeed, extraterritorial enforcement of
criminal law occurs mainly through elaborate extradition treaties, which usually ensure
that the acts in question are criminal in both states and contain numerous other
protections.49
Now consider the choice of law rules. In this context, the consequentialist analysis
plausibly yields a different outcome. Enforcing foreign civil judgments does not greatly
offend American notions of justice, because we have lower standards for civil procedure
than for criminal procedure, and our standards are not that different from those of other
47
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major liberal democracies. Importantly, enforcing such judgments promotes trade and
investment, especially if foreign sovereigns enforce American judgments as well. But
where the civil laws of other countries do offend American public policy, the laws and
judgments are not enforced. Here, as before, other nations appear to have the same
attitude, so U.S. courts would not induce reciprocal benefits even if they acted
otherwise.50
The act of state doctrine requires U.S. courts to treat the acts of foreign sovereigns
within their own territory as valid.51 Though the contours of the doctrine are ambiguous,
one of its chief effects is to ensure the enforcement of acts taken within the territory of
the foreign sovereign, and regulating behavior on the foreign territory. Putting the public
policy doctrine and the act of state doctrine together, we can see that American courts
implicitly presume that foreign states have a greater interest in regulating activity on their
territory, and a weaker interest in regulating activity on American territory—and
similarly for the U.S. government. This presumption seems entirely reasonable. As long
as other states behave similarly, and they appear to do so,52 the American courts ensure
that the U.S. obtains the reciprocal benefit of control over its own territory in return for
deference to foreign regulation of activities on foreign territory.
This fundamental idea—that states regulate activities on their own territories and
thus have little or no power over the activities that occur in foreign states—plainly
underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality. The U.S. gains from this rule insofar
as it avoids interference with its domestic regulation, but loses from this rule insofar as it
is prevented from regulating activities on foreign soil. All in all, the rule almost certainly
creates a net benefit. The U.S. generally has little interest in what occurs on foreign soil,
and other states have little interest in what occurs on American soil. As we have noted,
there are significant exceptions, but the overall assessment is fairly clear, and hence the
presumption applies, subject to congressional override.53
One of these exceptions provides further evidence of the existence of
consequentialist balancing on the part of courts. International law recognizes that a ship
at sea is under the jurisdiction of the state whose flag it flies, and this rule is generally
recognized in U.S. law. But when foreign ships are in American territorial waters, general
American statutes apply to protect the peace of the port, with the exception that “[a]bsent
a clear statement of congressional intent, general statutes may not apply to foreign-flag
50
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vessels insofar as they regulate matters that involve only the internal order and discipline
of the vessel, rather than the peace of the port.”54 The special treatment of the “peace of
the port” suggests that America’s interest in maintaining security in its ports and coastal
waters outweighs the foreign interest—more precisely, America’s interest in deferring to
the foreign interest—in regulating conduct onboard. Thus, the National Labor Relations
Act does not apply to the crew of the foreign ship, but ordinary criminal laws do.55
Moreover, the NLRA is applicable to labor relations between American longshoremen
and the foreign ship.56
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act reflects a more complex balancing. The
United States prohibits plaintiffs from suing foreign sovereigns on account of sovereign
acts such as acts of war or the use of police powers; the loss to American interests is
thought to be outweighed by the gain—avoiding affront to foreign sovereigns and
reducing the risk of litigation against the U.S. government on account of its sovereign
acts in foreign courts.57 But the important exception for commercial activity is also
mutually beneficial, as it permits wholly owned commercial entities to make enforceable
contractual commitments when they do business on foreign territory.
Finally, the Charming Betsy canon reflects the consequentialist calculus in a
particularly straightforward way. For the most part, states join international treaties and
consent to customary international law when doing so is in their interest.58 Thus,
international law already reflects the outcome of a consequentialist calculus. A particular
rule benefits the U.S. by constraining the activity of other states but hurts the U.S. by
constraining the U.S.; nonetheless, on balance the political branches believe that the rule
provides a net benefit for the U.S. If Congress then passes a statute that violates
international law, states protected by that law may retaliate against the U.S. government.
It is reasonable to assume that the cost of retaliation exceeds the benefit of the new
legislation, given that the U.S. government consented to (say) the treaty in the first place
because it believed the benefits from international cooperation would exceed the costs,
including the cost of refraining from future legislation inconsistent with the treaty. Of
course, in any given case the costs and benefits may have changed; that is why Congress
is permitted to pass laws that violate international law as long as the laws are clear
enough.
On the other side, the revenue rule provides a potential counterexample to our
thesis. It seems, at first sight, doubtful that enforcement of foreign tax judgments would
routinely violate important constitutional and common law norms in the way that
enforcement of foreign criminal judgments would. Thus, the case for the revenue rule is
54
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weaker than the case for the penal rule. Indeed, one might argue the revenue rule should
be folded into the standard choice of law analysis, where foreign judgments are evaluated
on a case by case basis, and rejected only if the judgment, or the legal system that
produced the judgment, violates American public policy.59
This argument was addressed in recent years by the Second Circuit in The
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.60 While the court
recognized the force of the criticisms of the revenue rule, it ended up strongly endorsing
the rule. The court’s most interesting reason is that, as a matter of historical fact, the U.S.
government and apparently every other government have strong reservations about
enforcing the tax judgments of foreign nations. Although the U.S. entered a handful of
tax treaties many decades ago that provided for enforcement of tax judgments, the Senate
was unhappy with the collection process. Commenting on some proposed new treaties,
the relevant Senate Committee said “it is not believed wise to have one government
collect the taxes which are due another government.”61 The Committee further noted that
“in many instances, or perhaps all, the courts would be called upon to enforce very harsh
civil penalties, and it was not deemed wise for our courts to undertake this particular
job.”62 This was in 1951. Since that time, the executive has apparently come to agree with
the Committee’s position:
Consistent with this continuing policy, the United States has over the years
entered into a number of tax treaties with foreign sovereigns that provide for
information exchange and, sometimes, limited collection assistance, but notably
fail to make any provision for general enforcement of foreign tax judgments or
claims. It seems to us that the usual absence in our negotiated tax conventions of
any provision for the extraterritorial enforcement of a sovereign’s tax judgments
or claims cannot be not accidental, but instead must reflect the considered policy
of the political branches of our government. Thus, the political branches of our
government have clearly expressed their intention to define and strictly limit the
parameters of any assistance given with regard to the extraterritorial enforcement
of a foreign sovereign’s tax laws. In this area of foreign relations policy where the
political branches have primacy, courts must be wary of intruding in a way that
undermines carefully conceived and negotiated policy choices. Accordingly, as a
general matter, that version of the revenue rule under which United States courts
abstain from assisting foreign sovereign plaintiffs with extraterritorial tax
enforcement is fully consistent with our broader legal, diplomatic, and
institutional framework.63
Thus, the bright-line revenue rule does reflect a balancing of costs and benefits. The costs
of enforcing foreign tax judgments are high because these judgments are often harsh and
59
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unfair. The benefits are zero if, as the court hints, other states are not willing to enforce
American tax judgments.64
There is an interesting question why courts are willing to take a case-by-case
approach to foreign contract and tort judgments, and not to foreign tax judgments, and
why the U.S. government has not attempted to alter existing practices. It is not clear that
any post hoc account adequately explain the current situation. Perhaps the best answer is
that nations tend to enforce contracts and punish torts in roughly the same way, while
taking widely varying approaches to taxation, as they do to the enforcement of criminal
law; thus, courts have more confidence in evaluating the first type of case than the second
type of case. Whatever the answer, the political branches appear to have concluded that
objectionable foreign tax judgments are common enough, and the likelihood of foreign
enforcement of American tax judgments is small enough, that case-by-case evaluation is
not necessary.65 Where decision costs are high, rules are better than standards. The
benefits of the revenue rule exceed the costs, and the courts defer to the political
branches’ judgment.66
This discussion of the revenue rule should make clear that the rule/standard
dimension is orthogonal to the question of what is the best account of the international
relations rules. Many of the current doctrines are general rules, reflecting aggregate
judgments. Usually the U.S. benefits when foreign states do not regulate activities on
American territory even though the U.S. may not regulate activities on foreign territory—
but this is not always the case. The U.S. might, for example, be willing to run the risk that
foreign antitrust law will be applied to American companies on American soil so as to be
able to apply American antitrust law to foreign companies on foreign soil (but which
export to the U.S.). Or the U.S. might be willing to allow foreign states to regulate the
practices of foreign businesses who employ foreigners on American soil in return for the
64
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right to regulate American businesses that employ Americans on foreign soil. The penal
and revenue rules are “rules”; so are the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.
Other doctrines operate more clearly as standards. Consider the public policy
exception to the choice of law rules. Operating case-by-case, courts evaluate foreign law
and then respect or reject it by asking whether it is consistent with American public
policy. For example, when American courts decide whether to enforce foreign civil
judgments, they make an overall evaluation of the quality of the foreign state’s judicial
system.67 The implicit assumption appears to be that decision costs are lower when courts
evaluate foreign civil legal systems than when they evaluate foreign criminal law or tax
systems. The choice between rules and standards reflects some assessment of decision
costs and errors costs, and we take no position on whether existing international relations
doctrines are insufficiently or excessively rule-like.68
Putting aside the rules/standards issue, we propose that the consequentialist theory
supplies the most plausible and general account of the international relations doctrines.
The doctrines operate in a way that is consistent with the theory, and the theory helps
explain the fact that courts are sometimes willing to endanger comity. Of course it is
possible to question whether the consequentialist assessment has been properly made, in
general or in particular cases. Behind the rhetoric, many of the existing disputes are about
exactly that question; let us turn to the nature of those disputes.
C. Questions and Doubts
Notwithstanding the plausibility of the consequentialist understanding, its fragility
should be immediately apparent. The first objection is that most of the time, courts lack
good tools to make the relevant judgments. Recall that it is important for judges to make
(1) an empirical determination or conjecture (a) that the foreign state will actually
reciprocate if deference occurs or (b) that it might retaliate in some way if deference is
withheld; and (2) a judgment that the benefits of reciprocation or nonretaliation by
foreign states exceed the cost of deference by the United States. Perhaps some cases are
easy, but many are difficult. It may well be that in the face of statutory ambiguity, courts
have no choice but to rely on some kind of presumption. To the extent that statutes are in
equipoise, the international relations doctrines may well be a sensible way to proceed. To
67
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the extent that the doctrines operate as clear statement principles, defeating the more
likely interpretation, they are harder to defend.
A second objection to the consequentialist theory is that courts do not insist as
much on reciprocity as the theory might appear to suggest. The evidence here is mixed.
In many cases, courts do mention, and appear to place weight on, the fact that the foreign
nation in question defers in the same manner that the courts are urged to do.69 But in
other cases, courts do not discuss the actions of the foreign state, and even reject the
notion that reciprocity matters.70 Perhaps the threat of some other kind of retaliation is a
significant motivation. The problem may be that courts simply have no way to determine
whether the foreign state reciprocated, or would retaliate, and thus fall back on crude
presumptions that they do in some cases (extraterritorial application of statutes, for
example) and not others (enforcement of penal judgments, for example).
Whatever the truth, we have trouble seeing a normative justification for many
applications of the doctrines when the other state does not reciprocate and when the risk
of retaliation is trivial. For example, it is unclear why the United States should not apply
its law to acts of sex discrimination by an American company against American workers
abroad. Nor is it clear that environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act,
should not apply to decisions by American actors in other nations, at least if it is believed
that Americans generally have an interest in the continued existence of such species,
wherever they may be found.71
A final objection to the consequentialist theory is that it is too narrow. One might
argue that courts should defer to foreign sovereign interests even when a reciprocal
benefit is not readily identifiable, because such deference will tend to advance America’s
international reputation. States may not reciprocate in a narrow way—for example, by
enforcing American judgments when American courts enforce their judgments—and they
may not otherwise retaliate, but they may nonetheless reciprocate by cooperating in other
areas of foreign relations when they might not otherwise be inclined to do so. The
problem with this argument is that it implies either that courts should always defer to
foreign interests—which seems unrealistic and implausible—or should calculate the
general reputational costs from failing to defer, which seems impossible.

69

Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1990) (court exercised its
discretion not to recognize Abu Dhabi judgment because of lack of reciprocity). See generally Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1895), a seminal Supreme Court case on international comity, which required
that the reciprocity condition be satisfied.
70
Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that reciprocity should no
longer be considered a requirement or concern for foreign judgment recognition); see generally Paul, supra,
at 49 (arguing that courts do not determine whether foreign sovereign reciprocates); Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act (not requiring reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 481, reporters’ note 1 (discussing cases on both sides but
concluding that reciprocity is not required).
71
On the standing question, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that concrete
interest is required to challenge failure to apply Endangered Species Act abroad); on the merits, see
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117. (8th Cir. 1990), reversed on standing grounds, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

19

A more general question, signaled by these various questions, involves the
position of the executive. An understanding of the grounds for the international relations
doctrines, and the legitimate questions and doubts, suggests that that position is crucial,
as we shall now see.
III. Executive Power
In our view, the executive should be permitted to interpret statutory ambiguities
so as to defeat the international relations principles. It would follow, for example, that the
executive should be permitted to construe the civil rights statutes or NEPA so as to apply
extraterritorially. The executive is in the best position to make the underlying judgments.
Moreover, the constitutional position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs
strongly supports this conclusion. But to understand these claims, it is necessary to back
up a bit.
A. The Chevron Doctrine
1. Two steps. Outside of the context of foreign affairs, the argument for executive
authority should be familiar, for courts regularly defer to executive interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions. The central idea is most famously associated with
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,72 which involved an ambitious effort by
the EPA to increase private flexibility under the Clean Air Act.73 Upholding the rule, the
Supreme Court created a two-step inquiry for assessing executive interpretations of law.
The first inquiry is whether Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue.74
If not, the second inquiry is whether the agency’s decision is “permissible,” which is to
say reasonable.75 The resulting rule is that executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes
must be upheld so long as they are reasonable—a dramatic grant of law-interpreting
power to executive agencies.
In explaining this rule, the Court could not, and did not, contend that the relevant
provision of the Clean Air Act contained any explicit delegation to the executive. Hence
the Court noted that “sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit.”76 The Clean Air Act does give the EPA the
power to issue regulations; in granting that power, perhaps the Act is best taken to say
that the EPA is implicitly entrusted with the interpretation of statutory terms. The Court
referred to this possibility, noting that Congress might have wanted the agency to strike
the relevant balance with the belief “that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”77
But lacking any evidence on the question, the Court did not insist that Congress in fact so
thought. On the contrary, it said that Congress’s particular intention “matters not.”78
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Instead the Court referred to two points about institutional competence: as
compared with executive agencies, judges lack expertise and they are not politically
accountable. Technical specialization is relevant to interpretation of the Clean Air Act,
and here the executive has conspicuous advantages over courts.79 And in interpreting law,
the agency may “properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is.”80 The Court was alert to the fact that it was reviewing a decision
made by the Reagan Administration, altering an interpretation by the Carter
Administration; and to say the least, the Reagan Administration had a self-conscious
program for reorienting the administrative state. Some of that program would inevitably
be undertaken through fresh interpretations of statutory terms. In the Court’s view, that
was hardly objectionable. It would be appropriate for agencies operating under the Chief
Executive, rather than judges, to assess “competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved in light of everyday
realities.”81
What is most striking about this passage, and most relevant for present purposes,
is the suggestion that resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about how
to assess “competing interests.” This is a candid recognition that assessments of policy
are sometimes indispensable to statutory interpretation—a point with particular
importance in the context of relations with other nations. Of course we can imagine cases
in which courts resolve ambiguities through the standard sources — by, for example,
using dictionaries, consulting statutory structure, deploying canons of construction, or
relying on legislative history if that technique is thought to be legitimate.82 Under
Chevron Step One, the executive will lose if the standard sources show that it is wrong.83
(To the extent that the international relations canons operate as part of Step One, they
trump executive power under Chevron – a proposition on which we shall cast some
doubt.84) But sometimes those sources will leave gaps; Chevron itself is such a case, and
there are many others. If the Court’s analysis is accepted on this point, its deference
principle seems readily understandable; we shall shortly investigate its relationship to the
international relations doctrines.
It is an understatement to say that the foundations of the Chevron approach have
been disputed. Perhaps the Court was saying that the resolution of statutory ambiguities
sometimes calls for technical expertise, and that when expertise matters, deference would
be appropriate. On this view, having roots in the New Deal’s enthusiasm for technical
competence,85 specialized administrators, rather than judges, should make the judgments
of policy that are realistically at stake in disputes over ambiguous terms. But the Court’s
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emphasis on accountability suggested a second possibility: Perhaps the two-step inquiry
is based on a healthy recognition that in the face of ambiguity, agency decisions must rest
on judgments of value, and those judgments should be made politically rather than
judicially. On this view, having roots in legal realism,86 value choices are a significant
part of statutory construction, and those choices should be made by democratically
accountable officials. This reading suggests a third and more ambitious possibility:
Perhaps Chevron is rooted on the separation of powers, requiring courts to accept
executive interpretations of statutory ambiguities in order to ensure against judicial
displacement of political judgments.87 In the domain of foreign relations, this possibility
might seem especially attractive.
But the Supreme Court has settled on a different understanding of the foundations
of Chevron: Courts defer to agency interpretations of law when and because Congress
has told them to do so.88 On this view, the deference principle is a reading of legislative
instruction, and hence Congress has ultimate control over the deference question. The
problem is that Congress hardly ever states its instructions on the deference question with
clarity, and hence Chevron cannot be grounded on an explicit or implicit legislative
instruction on that question. It follows that Chevron rests on a kind of legal fiction,89 to
the effect that a grant of the authority to make rules and conduct adjudications, and
perhaps other authority as well,90 carries with it interpretive power too. This, at any rate,
is the prevailing account of Chevron.
This account raises many questions, and we shall return to it below. For the
moment, the central point is that executive officers, entrusted with implementing the law,
are frequently entitled to settle the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions – a claim
with evident implications for the international relations doctrines.
3. Limits on deference. Chevron grants a great deal of power to the executive.
Nonetheless, the deference principle is not unlimited. For our purposes, three limitations
have particular importance.
(a) Delegated power of interpretation? The executive may not receive Chevronstyle deference if the agency has not exercised delegated power to make rules or to
undertake adjudications.91 It follows that if Congress has not given the relevant agency
rulemaking or adjudicatory power, or if the agency, while delegated that power, has not
exercised it in interpreting the law, the ordinary level of deference may be unavailable.92
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In this way, administrative law principles make it important to distinguish the
various procedures that precede executive interpretation. At one end of the spectrum is
the rulemaking or adjudicative procedure that produces an interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. At the other end of the spectrum is the mere “litigating position,” where the
executive asserts a particular interpretation for the first time in litigation in which the
executive is a party or an amicus. Interpretations produced by rulemaking or adjudication
receive Chevron deference.93 Agency interpretations that emerge from policy statements,
or from interpretive rules, are often not entitled to Chevron deference, but they do receive
a measure of respect under Mead and Skidmore.94
By contrast, litigating positions receive no deference at all, apparently on the
theory that Congress would not want courts to defer to positions that may be
opportunistic and that are not preceded by any kind of check on possible arbitrariness.95
The refusal to defer to litigation positions is plausible in general. But it may well be
inapplicable in the foreign relations setting, where the executive branch simply may not
be able to set policy through formal procedures or in advance because of the fluidity of
events. We will return to this point below.
(b) Nondelegation canons? Courts have sometimes denied the executive lawinterpreting authority on the ground that the key decisions must be explicitly made by the
national lawmaker. The most important principle is that the executive is not permitted to
construe statutes so as to raise serious constitutional doubts.96 So long as the statute is
unclear, and the constitutional question serious, Congress must decide to raise that
question via explicit statement. Some canons of interpretation thus operate as part of the
court’s analysis during Step One; the executive’s interpretation might fail because it is
inconsistent with the meaning of the statute, as established, in part, by reference to the
canon against constitutional avoidance.
Why does the Avoidance Canon overcome the executive’s power of
interpretation? The reason is that we are speaking of a kind of nondelegation canon—
one that attempts to require Congress to make its instructions exceedingly clear, and that
does not permit the executive to make constitutionally sensitive decisions on its own.97
Other interpretive principles, also serving as nondelegation canons, trump Chevron as
well. One of the most general is the rule of lenity, which says that in the face of
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ambiguity, criminal statutes will be construed favorably to criminal defendants.98
Similarly, the executive cannot interpret statutes and treaties unfavorably to Native
Americans.99 Consider also the notion that unless Congress has spoken with clarity, the
executive is not allowed to apply statutes retroactively.100 There are many other
examples.101 In areas ranging from broadcasting to the war on terror,102 the
nondelegation canons operate as constraints on the interpretive discretion of the
executive.
(c) Organic statutes and others. Under administrative law principles, it is also
important to distinguish between statutes that authorize agency action (sometimes called
“organic” statutes), and more general statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),103 which regulate agency behavior.
According to standard principles, agencies are entitled to deference insofar as they are
construing statutes with whose implementation they are charged, but not to deference in
the interpretation of the more general statutes that regulate their conduct.104 The
Environmental Protection Agency, for example, does not receive deference insofar as it is
interpreting FOIA to permit it to keep certain information secret.
For our purposes, we might therefore distinguish between statutes that grant the
executive the authority to address some foreign affairs problem (“authorizing statutes”)
and statutes that incorporate a background comity (or anticomity) judgment that applies
to a range of disputes (“international relations” statutes). Authorizing statutes may be
general, such as the statute that provides the president with authority to regulate
immigration,105 or specific, such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force against al
Qaeda.106 International relations statutes apply regardless of the type of cause of action or
enforcement, and indeed apply even to common law litigation. Typical international
relations statutes include the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgment Act. Statutes of this kind are indeed general, but they are not akin to
statutes limiting agency authority, such as FOIA and the APA.
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It is generally agreed that an authorization statute, such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Act or the Food and Drug Act, is subject to analysis under Chevron.107 In
addition, there is no reason in principle why that analysis—understood as a recognition of
the executive’s primary role in advancing interpretations of statutes—cannot be extended
to an authorization statute such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which
initiated the military attack on Afghanistan.108 To be sure, the law is not settled here.
When rulemaking and adjudication are not involved, deference may not be available.109
In our view, however, deference is fully appropriate under any delegation of foreign
affairs authority to the President. We shall return to the issue in more detail below;110 for
now, let us simply assert that when Congress grants such authority to the President, it
ought to be understood to instruct courts to defer to his reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutory terms. Further, international relations statutes may be ambiguous, in
general or as applied in particular cases, as they reflect general judgments by Congress,
whose meaning may not be clear in any particular case; again deference to the
executive’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions is justified, or so we will
argue.
C. The Executive and International Comity
The executive plays an important role in litigation that affects foreign sovereigns,
even when the executive is not a party. Deference to the executive is an established
element of many international relations doctrines, but the law has not—peculiarly—
settled on a general principle of deference where an executive agency advances an
interpretation of a statute that has foreign relations implications.
In this section, we first discuss the established rules and then we turn to our
recommendations. The argument has a degree of complexity, and it may be useful to set
out the basic argument in advance. In many cases, the executive should be entitled to
Chevron deference under the terms of existing doctrine, because it will be acting pursuant
to some kind of formal procedure or otherwise through channels that trigger Chevron.
Even if no formal procedure and no such channels are involved, a grant of authority to
the executive in the domain of foreign affairs ought generally to include a power of
interpretation, so that Chevron deference is appropriate. If a relevant interpretation exists,
the comity doctrines are trumped, because they should not be taken to operate as
constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One. If the interpretation is
unreasonable, of course, it will be invalid under Step Two; but Step Two invalidations are
rare in the domestic sphere,111 and they should be rare here as well. If there is no
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interpretation of a statutory term, but simply a policy judgment by the executive, the
courts should defer as well, using Chevron as an analogy. The Avoidance Canon provides
an important exception, and there are others; but the comity doctrines do not belong in
the same category as that canon or other exceptions.
1. Traditional Deference to the Executive in Foreign Relations
In some ways, deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is
commonplace. Before the enactment of the FSIA, courts would relax sovereign immunity
when the executive suggested that courts should do so. This practice was institutionalized
in the twentieth century; the Department of State would intervene in cases when it
believed that the court should take or deny immunity, and courts typically followed the
view of the Department.112 Indeed, courts deferred to a whole “executive jurisprudence,”
parsing State Department opinions for principles that would control cases where the State
Department did not intervene.113 Today, courts continue to take account of the
executive’s views in FSIA cases114 and engage in pre-FSIA style deference to the
executive in cases involving head-of-state immunity.115
A strain of thinking about the act of state doctrine has also long held that courts
should defer when the executive informs them that the act of state doctrine should not
apply in a particular case.116 In a clear analogy to Chevron, courts also usually defer
when the executive advances a treaty interpretation,117 and when the executive expresses
a view about head of state immunity.118 They defer absolutely to executive
determinations of whether a foreign state “exists” or not.119 And even when the executive
and Congress come into conflict about the extent of their foreign relations
responsibilities, in most instances courts effectively defer to the executive by refusing to
decide on the merits because of concerns about justiciability.120 In the face of such a
refusal, the views of the executive effectively prevail.
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Deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is traditionally based on both
constitutional and functional considerations. Courts sometimes say that the executive has
the primary foreign relations power.121 This power is sometimes traced to the vesting
clause of the Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief clause, and other provisions.122 But
the explicit grants of foreign relations power to the executive are rather sparse and
ambiguous. From the document itself, it is hardly clear that the executive has “primary”
authority in the domain of foreign affairs.123 Hence the underlying justifications are often
less textual than functional, or based on traditional practices and understandings. The
nation must speak in “one voice” in its foreign policy; the executive can do this, while
Congress and the courts cannot.124 The executive has expertise and flexibility; can keep
secrets; can efficiently monitor developments; can act quickly and decisively. The other
branches cannot.125 Unlike the courts, and as emphasized in Chevron, the executive is
politically accountable as well as uniquely knowledgeable, and its accountability argues
for deference to its judgments about how to assess the competing facts and values. Of
course, none of these advantages justify absolute deference to the executive in all cases,
and courts have not gone this far. The executive cannot violate a clear law (putting
constitutional questions to one side). But in cases of ambiguity, courts are inclined to
defer to the position of the executive.
2. Conflicts Between Regulations and International Comity (Including A Brief Tour)
In light of this longstanding deference to the executive, it is surprising that courts
have not, so far, consistently and clearly indicated that they will accept the views of the
executive about whether to apply the international relations doctrines.126 Suppose that the
executive interprets a statute in a manner that violates those doctrines. Should a court
defer to the interpretation, or should it reverse the interpretation on the grounds that it
violates the doctrines?
This question might well pose a literal conflict between Chevron deference and
the international relations principles. Suppose, for example, that an agency entitled to
Chevron deference issues a regulation that conflicts with the international relations
principles. If so, the court must develop rules of priority. Alternatively, the conflict might
not literally involve Chevron, because the executive has not exercised delegated power to
make rules or to conduct adjudications127—but it might nonetheless present a difficult
question of how to reconcile executive power with comity. Suppose, for example, that the
Department of Justice concludes that the antitrust law should apply outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States, but the decision does not follow any kind of formal
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procedure; it is offered in litigation. If so, it is possible that Chevron deference would be
denied to that decision, on the ground that litigating positions do not receive deference.128
Nonetheless, we believe that such deference is due to litigating positions in the domain of
foreign relations; and even if this judgment is rejected, a court might want to pay a great
deal of attention to the relevant position of the executive, and hence a conflict with the
comity principles is easily imaginable.
In the face of such a conflict, a court might take one of three positions. First, it
could hold that the international comity doctrines prevail over the executive’s
interpretation. Perhaps the principles would be treated as part of Chevron Step One, and
hence defeat the executive’s view. Second, a court could hold that the executive’s
interpretation prevails. Perhaps the executive, in effect, has discretion whether to interpret
a statute in a way that violates international law or potentially offends foreign sovereigns.
Third, a court might hold that some middle way is preferable: perhaps the executive
interpretation and the international comity doctrines receive equal weight. A court might,
for example, require that the executive take account of international comity, but defer to
an interpretation that endangers comity for especially good reasons.
The case law, so far, reflects a range of positions and is difficult to parse; there is
no settled view about the relationship between the views of the executive and the
doctrines. In some cases, the views of the executive have proved crucial. In other cases,
courts have referred to the comity doctrines without paying much attention to the position
of the executive.
A leading case is Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,129 where the
Supreme Court indicated the importance of the executive’s view. An alien was ordered to
be removed to Somalia, his country of birth and citizenship; he objected that he could not
be removed without consent from Somalia. The statute was unclear, and the Court was
badly divided on whether such consent was a prerequisite for removal. In resolving the
question in the government’s favor, the Court seemed to suggest that so long as there was
room for ambiguity, the executive’s view would prevail.130 Indeed, the Court appeared to
go well beyond Chevron so as to adopt a kind of clear statement principle, arguing that
the view of the President would settle the law unless Congress had clearly provided
otherwise: “To infer an absolute rule of acceptance where Congress has not clearly set it
forth would run counter to our customary policy of deference to the President in matters
of foreign affairs.”131 The Court stressed that removal decisions “may implicate our
relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing political and
economic circumstances.”132 In these circumstances, the Court was reluctant to construe
an ambiguous statute to limit the executive’s discretion. Strikingly, the Court made no
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reference to the possible relevance of international law and the international relations
doctrines, emphasizing instead the views of the executive.
A contrary signal can be found in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., which
involved the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination
by an American employer against an American employee on foreign territory.133 The
defendant argued that the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute violated the presumption
against extraterritoriality. The Court agreed, but it did not directly confront the Chevron
issue, because the EEOC does not have the authority to issue rules and EEOC’s
interpretations have not been consistent.134 In line with our argument here, it would have
been possible for the Court to follow the view of the current executive and hence to apply
Title VII extraterritorially because the executive argued for that result. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the presumption against extraterritoriality must
prevail over the agency’s interpretation, but he gave no account of why the presumption
should receive priority. More recently, the Court has endorsed the presumption without
indicating that the executive’s view matters at all; it has treated the presumption as part of
the analysis under Step One.135
The Court offered mixed and confusing signals in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise
Line, Ltd.,136 where it held that the Americans with Disabilities Act may be applied to
foreign-flagged ships except to the extent that application of the ADA would interfere
with the internal affairs of those ships. In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote
that “general statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreignflag vessel in United States territory if the interests of the United States or its citizens,
rather than interests internal to the ship, are at stake.”137 But such statutes do not apply to
regulate matters “that involve only the internal order and discipline of the vessel, rather
than the peace of the port”—an exception rooted in “international comity.”138
Cruise ships flying under foreign flags offer accommodations and travel services
to over seven million Americans each year,139 and hence the United States had
considerable interest in protecting its citizens against violations of the ADA (a fact that
helps account for the executive’s claim that the statute should indeed apply). Hence there
would be no blanket rule against application of that statute; the outcome would depend on
whether there would be an effect on the internal affairs of the ship. In answering that
question, the plurality emphasized the International Convention for Safety of Life At Sea,
and thus suggested the importance of taking “conflicts with international law into
account”—but it did so only in the context of indicating that attention to the convention
133
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was explicitly “urged by the United States” in its brief.140 It is noteworthy, however, that
no member of the Court paid a great deal of attention to the position of the executive, or
suggested that that position might be determinative—a striking difference from Jama,
decided only six months earlier. It would be easy to imagine an opinion to the effect that
application of the ADA would be justified in large part by reference to the claims of the
executive, which was in the best position to balance the competing interests.
In Ali v. Ashcroft,141 the court of appeals refused to defer to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s interpretation of a statute that provides for the deportation of
aliens. The petitioners argued that the statute did not permit deportation to countries
without functioning governments—Somalia, in this case as in Jama. The government
claimed that INS regulations permitted such deportation, and were a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. The court disagreed, holding that, in fact, INS regulations did
not provide for such deportation. Much more relevantly for our purposes, the court said
that the petitioners’ interpretation of the statute was consistent with international law—
including customary international law of human rights and three human rights treaties—
given that the petitioners would be subject to human rights abuses if they were returned
to Somalia. Hence the court suggested that the international comity principles would
trump the executive’s interpretation, though the absence of clarity in the governing
regulations made the suggestion less than a holding. It is not at all clear that the court’s
analysis survives the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Jama.
In Ma v. Ashcroft,142 the court of appeals spoke in similar terms. It held that the
INS could not indefinitely detain an alien convicted of manslaughter because his home
country would not repatriate him. The court rejected the agency’s interpretation of its
authority to detain because Chevron was trumped by the existence of a serious
constitutional question—here, under the due process clause.143 The court said that
Chevron principles “are not applicable where a substantial constitutional question is
raised by an agency's interpretation of a statute it is authorized to construe.”144 This use
of the Avoidance Canon is entirely compatible with our approach here.145 But the court,
citing the Charming Betsy canon, also noted that indefinite detention would violate
international law.146 The notation played only a modest role in the court’s analysis, but it
is noteworthy that there was no suggestion that the executive’s view might prevail over
international law.
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A major contrast is provided by Corus Staal BV v. Department of Commerce,147
in which the court of appeals allowed an agency’s interpretation of a statute to defeat the
Charming Betsy canon. In the court’s view, the agency’s methodology for determining
whether a firm has engaged in illegal dumping was based on a reasonable interpretation
of an ambiguous statute, and thus entitled to respect under Chevron. The appellant argued
that this methodology had been rejected by the World Trade Organization in several
interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement, a provision of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. The court simply rejected the argument that it should give deference to
either the GATT or the WTO’s interpretations of GATT articles; the executive’s
interpretation prevailed.148
These cases leave a great deal of uncertainty, but we can summarize them, or at
least their hints, as follows. Where the executive does not express a view on the meaning
of a statute or the outcome of litigation, courts apply the international relations doctrines.
Where the executive’s interpretation is ambiguous, arguably unconstitutional,
unreasonable, or ambiguous, the international comity doctrines are given considerable
and perhaps decisive weight. Where the executive’s interpretation can be found in a
formal rule or adjudication, there is a chance that it will prevail over the doctrines. But, as
noted earlier, cases in the last category are extremely rare—only the trade cases decided
by the Federal Circuit seem clearly to belong to this category—so the actual approach of
courts when Chevron and the comity doctrines conflict remains uncertain.149 It is also
unclear whether courts would defer to the executive when it issues its interpretation in an
informal manner, not preceded by rulemaking or adjudication.
The conflicts discussed so far concern the conventional Chevron-style setting
where the executive advances an interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Other conflicts
occur without any such interpretation. A recurring controversy is whether in act of state
cases, courts should defer to the executive’s determination that a decision on the merits
would or would not cause foreign relations problems. The courts have wavered on this
issue. In earlier cases, courts generally deferred.150 Although more recently the Supreme
Court has divided on this issue, courts usually give the executive’s views some weight.151
In Foreign Sovereign Immunity cases, the courts similarly will take into consideration the
judgment of the executive that adjudicating the liability of a foreign sovereign would
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interfere with foreign relations.152 In Anti-Terrorist Act and Alien Tort Statute cases,
courts have also paid close attention to the executive’s views about the implications of
the litigation for foreign relations.153
By contrast, we are unaware of cases in which the executive has intervened to
argue that foreign law or foreign judgments should, or should not, be enforced because of
their foreign relations implications. As a general matter, however, courts agree that the
executive’s views should be taken into account when determining whether international
comity requires them to abstain from deciding a case on the merits.154
From a doctrinal perspective, this latter group of cases and the Chevron cases are
different. In the Chevron setting, courts defer to the executive’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory provision because they interpret the authorizing statute as implicitly
delegating law-interpreting authority to the executive.155 In the other setting, the statute or
common law is more or less clear, and the court abstains or grants immunity because of
the executive’s views about the foreign policy implications of a decision on the merits. In
analytical terms, however, the two settings are similar, and raise identical normative and
institutional questions. In both settings, the background legal rules reflect a crude
balancing of the costs and benefits of judicial decisions that may offend foreign
sovereigns. And in both settings, the question arises whether these background rules are
so crude, so insensitive to day-to-day changes in foreign relations, and so clumsy in the
hands of judges who lack information and expertise about foreign relations, that it would
be better if judges defer to the executive whenever they can do so.
D. The Argument for Executive Power
Our account of the international relations doctrines and the rationale for the
Chevron rule imply that in the context of foreign relations, the executive’s interpretations
should prevail over the comity doctrines. Those doctrines should not be treated as part of
the court’s analysis under Step One. It follows that courts should defer to the executive’s
judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable, or
constitutionally questionable, because the executive is in the best position to reconcile the
competing interests, and in the face of statutory silence or ambiguity, Congress should
therefore be taken to have delegated interpretive power to the executive. If the executive
152
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decides that the statute should be interpreted so as to overcome the comity principles, it
ought to be permitted to interpret the statute in that way. There is no reason to distrust the
executive’s competence in making the underlying choices. In fact the Chevron approach
literally applies to any executive interpretation that follows formal procedures, and the
logic of the case suggests that it should literally apply as well to interpretations in the
domain of foreign relations that do not follow such procedures.
It is relevant here that considerations of constitutional structure argue strongly in
favor of deference to the executive—a point that makes the argument for deference
stronger than in Chevron itself. Hence it should not be important whether the executive’s
decision follows rulemaking or adjudication, or otherwise has the force of law. In the
context of foreign relations, the answer is supplied by the interpretation of the executive,
subject to the constraint of reasonableness.
1. Comparative advantages. This conclusion follows whatever the ground for the
international comity principles. We have criticized the entanglement theory; but even if
the theory is right, the executive branch, unlike the judiciary, is in a good position to
know whether concerns about entanglement justify a decision to invoke comity.
Litigation produces entanglement problems when the decision on the merits is likely to
offend a foreign sovereign, perhaps leading it to withdraw cooperation in some area of
foreign relations that are vital to America’s interests. The court has no expertise in
determining whether a certain kind of litigation will offend a foreign sovereign or not,
whether the sovereign is likely to respond by reducing cooperation, and whether such
cooperation is valuable or not. These judgments are all at the core of the foreign relations
expertise of the executive.
Now consider the consequentialist theory. Recall that this theory holds that the
U.S. should defer to a foreign act only if (1) the foreign state will or is likely to
reciprocate for comity, or retaliate for violating the comity rules; and (2) the benefits
from such reciprocation or nonretaliation exceed the costs of deference. These two
conditions require complex inquiries, with empirical and normative dimensions, for
which the executive’s institutional position gives it a decisive advantage over the courts.
Three points are important here.
First, the executive branch carefully tracks relations with foreign states, and it is
in a better position to predict whether a particular act of deference is likely to result in
reciprocation by foreign states, or whether such statutes would retaliate for a violation of
the comity principles. The prediction is based on subtle factors—including the nature of
the relationship with the foreign state, the cultural norms of that state, its legal system and
other institutions, its politics, and so forth. These are factors followed and assessed by the
Department of State. They are well beyond the usual kind of judicial factfinding.
Second, the executive branch is in a better position to understand the benefits of
foreign reciprocation or the likelihood and costs of retaliation than the court is. Suppose,
for example, that, in response to litigation against China by Chinese victims of Chinese
repression, China begins to issue vague threats to Taiwan. Are these threats credible? Are
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they meant to signal that China will take a more confrontational stance toward Taiwan if
the U.S. allows Chinese citizens to sue China for human rights violations? Or perhaps
they merely signal a general chilling of relations, in which case the U.S. may have more
trouble obtaining Chinese assistance in pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear plans?
Courts cannot answer these questions; the executive can.
The third point involves accountability. In deciding whether American law should
be applied abroad, or whether a statute should be construed conformably to international
law, the executive must balance competing interests and make judgments of value. It
must ask questions not only about reciprocity and retaliation, but also about the
importance of applying (say) the National Labor Relations Act to protect Americans
aboard a foreign ship in American waters, or the ban on sex discrimination to American
companies doing business in China, or the Endangered Species Act to the activities of
American institutions operating in Japan.156 At least at first glance, those judgments
should be made by those who are accountable to the public, not by courts. The executive
might well pay a price if it concludes that American civil rights or environmental law
ought not to be applied to American activities in other nations. As in the Chevron
context, the executive is far more likely to be punished by the public if it causes or fails
to resolve tensions with other countries or a foreign policy crisis than a court is. Indeed,
although courts routinely anger foreign sovereigns,157 we cannot think of any case where
the public has put pressure on courts because of such crises—probably because the
connection between judicial decisions and international tensions is not salient enough.
The flip side of accountability is concern about political bias. Because courts are
independent, they may be more neutral than the executive is, and thus, perhaps, more
likely to interpret the statute impartially. But this concern is identical in the Chevron
context, where, as we noted, courts have plausibly concluded that the executive’s control
over policy justifies its heightened authority over the interpretation of statutes. In any
case judges may have biases of their own. Any relevant “bias” on the part of the
executive, in the domain of foreign affairs, is best understood as the operation of
democracy in action—at least if the executive’s interpretation is reasonable and if
constitutionally sensitive issues are not involved.158
Thus, the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the
foreign relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting, while the accountability
rationale for deference is at least equally strong. These conclusions suggest that if the
approach in Chevron is correct, then deference to executive interpretations in foreign
relations cases must also be the appropriate approach. The core reason is that resolution
of statutory ambiguities involve judgments of policy, and those judgments are best made
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by the executive. None of this means that courts have no relevant expertise. Courts might
have a better sense of how enforcement of foreign judgments may harm the integrity of
the American judicial system than the executive does. But this advantage is relatively
minor compared to the advantages of the executive.
What we have said so far also applies outside the Chevron setting, where statutes
and common law are relatively clear, and the executive branch argues that the court
should not decide on the merits. Here, to be sure, there is a greater danger of conflict
between the executive and Congress, but Congress has not objected to the traditional
doctrines of executive deference, and until it does so, the constitutional problems seem
more theoretical than real.159 The normative question is whether the executive’s
institutional expertise gives it advantages over courts in this setting as it does in the
Chevron setting, and the answer is surely yes. In both cases, the argument for deference
to the executive is that it has more expertise in foreign relations than the courts do, and
that the executive’s accountability for foreign relations is more important than the courts’
independence from political pressure.160
A possible counterargument is that Congress, in one important instance, reduced
the executive’s influence over foreign relations, and did so with the executive’s approval.
As noted above, the FSIA was enacted, in part, because diplomatic pressure on the
Department of State to grant immunity to foreign sovereigns resulted in inconsistent
decisions.161 Before the statute was enacted, courts would permit lawsuits against foreign
sovereigns if the Department of State sanctioned such suits, and the Department of State
generally sanctioned suits when the disputed act was commercial in nature—for example,
when the defendant was a business owned by the foreign sovereign—and not otherwise.
The FSIA codified the State Department’s jurisprudence, with some modifications.162 In
doing so, it drastically reduced the State Department’s discretion to depart from its own
rules in order to reward friends or punish enemies where United States foreign policy
interests so required. But the statute itself contains important pockets of executive
discretion.163 And, more to the point, the Supreme Court has signaled that courts should
take into account the executive’s view about whether they should exercise jurisdiction
over a sovereign in any particular case.164 Thus, even a statute that to all appearances
159
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takes away the discretion of the executive has been “Chevronized.” The executive and a
majority of the Supreme Court appear to believe that, although courts can handle routine
cases involving foreign sovereign defendants, they should continue to defer to the
executive when it states an interest, despite the fact that such an approach reopens the
door to political pressure. Once again, the executive’s flexibility and expertise takes
precedence.
2. A response. It would be possible to respond that all or some of the comity
doctrines should be seen as nondelegation principles, and that if this is so, then a clear
statement from Congress is required in order to produce a result that compromises
comity. Perhaps the doctrines apply under Step One, and thus forbid contrary
interpretations from the executive. The most obvious candidate for this approach is the
principle calling for conformity to international law; perhaps Congress should be required
to speak clearly if it wants to require to authorize a violation. The same analysis might be
applied to the canon against extraterritoriality;165 perhaps the executive should not be
permitted to decide on extraterritorial application of domestic law on its own.
In our view, however, it would not be easy to categorize the comity doctrines as
nondelegation principles. It is reasonable to say that Congress must speak clearly if it
seeks to raise a serious constitutional question, and hence that the executive may not raise
such a question on its own166; courts plausibly insist that the national lawmaker must
expressly authorize invasions of constitutionally sensitive domains. But in light of the
distinctive role of the executive in the area of foreign relations,167 a clear statement
principle, in that area, would make no structural sense, at least as a general rule. A more
refined argument would attempt to disaggregate the comity principles and urge that one
or a few of them, such as the principle against violations of international law, trump
executive interpretations, perhaps if the United States has independently committed itself
to the relevant international law. At most, however, this argument would justify a narrow
use of clear statement principles,168 and even such a narrow use is not simple to defend.
E. A Historical Evolution
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Many of the international relations principles are very old. The Charming Betsy
doctrine, the presumption against extraterritoriality, international comity, foreign
sovereign immunity, the penal and revenue rules, and the act of state doctrine can all be
traced back to the nineteenth century, and most of them to the early years of the
republic.169 Many of them evolved during the ascendancy of ideas that are no longer
important or even relevant in American jurisprudence—including natural law ideas and
the pre-Erie conception of the common law—and in a period when the U.S. was a small,
weak nation whose foreign policy was inward-looking and in some ways isolationist. The
national government was weaker relative to the states, and the presidency was weaker
relative to Congress, than they are today.170
To say the least, things are almost unimaginably different today. The vast changes
in foreign policy, the greater relative power of the United States, the institutional
structure of American government, and ways of thinking about law suggest, at the least,
that the international relations principles need to be reconceived. We offer here a brisk
overview of the relevant developments. The basic point is that Chevron represents a clear
judicial recognition of changing developments in the domestic domain; a parallel shift,
recognizing interpretive power for the executive, might well be taken as a recognition of
related developments on the international side. Indeed, the latter shift, in the domain of
foreign affairs, is far simpler to explain and to defend than the former one. In these
circumstances, the real oddity is that domestic law has been “Chevronized” whereas
foreign relations law has not been.
It is a commonplace that the rise of the administrative state in the twentieth
century revolutionized constitutional law.171 Under nineteenth century constitutional law,
it was assumed that while Congress would regulate the national market, most important
domestic issues would be controlled by states and municipalities; these included labormanagement relations, environmental protection, commercial fraud, antitrust problems,
workplace safety, and much more.172 Massive technological change in the late nineteenth
century -- and the emergence of an industrialized, interdependent, highly urbanized
national economy -- undermined this allocation of authority. In the twentieth century,
courts and the political branches ultimately agreed that much regulation would need to
occur at the national level, despite the losses to local control and other federalism
values.173 They also agreed that although the executive usually could not act without
congressional authorization,174 broad delegations of regulatory authority to the executive
169
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were necessary and permissible because of the many institutional advantages of the
executive, including specialization and a capacity for rapid change over time.175 Chevron
itself can be seen as a culmination of this development. Indeed, the decision is a natural
product of the repudiation of judge-made common law and of the large-scale shift to
lawmaking by executive institutions.176
It is easy to see a parallel process occurring in foreign relations law, though with
one wrinkle.177 The wrinkle is that the framers agreed that the national government’s
foreign relations powers would be less restricted than its domestic relations powers, and
so formally the national government has had a freer hand from the beginning.178 The
major change was thus in the realm of separation of powers, and specifically the massive
increase in the executive’s foreign affairs power relative to that of Congress.179 Critics of
this transformation greatly fear executive overreaching,180 and there is reasonable dispute
about the extent of this risk and about how best to limit it; but critics and supporters agree
that changes in the global environment justify at least some expansion of executive
powers. A modern president, unlike George Washington, needs to be able to respond
quickly to intercontinental ballistic missiles, cyberattacks, terrorist attacks, global
financial crises, and other dangers that will not wait for Congress to act. The critics of
broad executive power have not argued that ambiguities in federal statutes should be
construed by judges, rather than by the President and those who operate under him.
To say this is not to take a stand on the question whether the President can act on
his own. It is merely to acknowledge that legislation often grants the executive some
discretion to act rapidly in response to perceived threats—and hence the increase in
executive power, usually made possible by statutes, has reflected a recognition by
Congress itself of this pragmatic point.181 In these circumstances, deference to the
executive’s views on the meaning of ambiguous statutes, rather than invocation of the
comity principles, is a step that seems at once modest and a bit late.
It follows that the argument for Chevron-style deference in foreign affairs is
similar to, and at least as strong as, the case for such deference in domestic affairs. The
parallel historical rise in executive power in both contexts, though the explicit permission
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or at least acquiescence of Congress as well as courts, is hardly surprising. All that is left
is to acknowledge the importance of executive deference in foreign relations as clearly as
we do in the domestic setting.
F. A Note on Congress
It might be thought that the argument for judicial deference to executive
interpretation of ambiguous law serves, in a sense, to take the side of the executive
against the national legislature. On an extreme version of view that we have defended, the
expertise of the executive, and its special role in the domain of foreign affairs, mean that
courts should grant discretion to the executive unless Congress has made its view
unmistakably clear – and possibly even when Congress has done so. Chevron-style
deference, mixed with a requirement of an exceedingly clear congressional statement,
might be taken to suggest a transfer of authority, not from courts to the executive, but
from Congress to the President.
We do not mean our argument to be taken in this way. The issues we have
explored involve genuinely ambiguous statutes, and the question is whether the court will
respect the view of the executive or instead rule in the way indicated by the comity
doctrines. If Congress seeks to resolve the question, it is entitled to do exactly that under
Chevron Step One. To be sure, it might be tempting to read the argument for executive
power to suggest a kind of clear statement principle; perhaps that principle would be
constitutionally inspired in some domains, as for example with the suggestion that
Congress should not lightly be taken to intrude on the President’s inherent power to settle
important questions of foreign relations.182 When the President does have a claim to such
power, there is indeed reason for a clear statement principle, justified by reference to the
Avoidance Canon. But the argument we have made is limited to cases of real ambiguity,
where there is no claim of inherent constitutional power, and where the question is
whether to follow the views of the executive or instead one or another comity principle.
It follows that nothing we have said bears on cases where the executive asks a
court to ignore a clear statute because of its foreign relations implications in situations
where the view of the executive is clearly at odds with that of Congress. A subset of such
cases includes high-profile conflicts between the executive and Congress, as when the
executive seizes steel mills in the absence of congressional authorization,183 sends troops
to war in violation of a statute that restricts the use of troops without congressional
approval,184 or engages in espionage in apparent conflict with existing statutes.185 Courts
sometimes resolve these cases by determining which branch has the constitutional
authority to act; at other times, they avoid resolving these cases on justiciability
grounds.186 In this Article, we do not express an opinion on these longstanding disputes.
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Our focus, involving problems that are less sensational but far more important to the
ordinary operation of federal law, is on statutes that are ambiguous rather than clear,
which is the standard domain of the international relations doctrines.
IV. The AUMF and the War on Terror
It should be clear that the analysis thus far bears on many questions raised by the
war on terror. It is readily imaginable that congressional enactments will contain
ambiguous provisions that may or may not be construed to fit with the international
relations doctrines. The anticomity principles, no less than the comity principles, might
conflict with the views of the executive in the context of terrorism-related judgments. In
our view, the executive should be entitled to interpret such provisions as it sees fit,
subject to the qualifications that its interpretations must be reasonable and that Congress
must specifically authorize intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests.
Because of the pervasive importance of the war on terror, the number of
imaginable cases is large. For example, the executive might want the civil rights statutes
not to apply to American businesses operating in Saudi Arabia because of the importance
of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in combating terrorism. But for purposes of analysis, it
will be useful to focus on just one example, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF), by which Congress authorized the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.187
If the discussion thus far is correct, the President is permitted to interpret
ambiguities in the AUMF as he (reasonably) sees fit, even if the consequence is to
overcome the international comity doctrines. Indeed, the argument for this conclusion is
even stronger than in ordinary contexts, because the basic purpose of the AUMF is to
protect the nation in a way that might well compromise comity with at least some other
nations.
From the standpoint of standard administrative law doctrine, it might be
responded that with the AUMF, the President has been given neither adjudicatory
authority nor the authority to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking—and hence that
he is not authorized to do anything, under the AUMF, having the force and effect of law.
On this view, elaborated above, the precondition for Chevron deference is absent. This
argument might be supported with an analogy. The executive branch is not entitled to
Chevron deference insofar as it is enforcing the criminal law.188 The reason is
187
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straightforward: Prosecutors within the Department of Justice have not been delegated
the authority to interpret the statutes that they implement. For the Department of Justice,
the power of prosecution is not plausibly taken to confer law-interpreting authority as
well.189 Perhaps the same can be said when the President implements the AUMF; indeed,
it might be urged that the President has the same relationship to the AUMF that the
Department of Justice has to the statutes under which it brings prosecutions.
A narrow response would be that under the AUMF, the President or his delegates
can indeed make rules and regulations, and hence if they have done so, he or they are
would be entitled to Chevron deference under standard principles. An authorization to
use force is best taken to grant the power to issue necessary rules to ensure that force is
properly used. But suppose that no such rules have been issued. If we step back a bit, we
will see that the objection to Chevron deference is unconvincing even on its own terms.
In ordinary Chevron cases, a delegation of law-interpreting power is inferred from the
authority to produce rules or orders with the force of law. But in the context of an
authorization to use force, most of the President’s decisions are not preceded by
rulemaking or adjudication, and hence the grant or denial of such authority is irrelevant.
By its very nature, any AUMF is best taken as an implicit delegation to the President to
resolve ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees fit.190 Indeed, this conclusion seems
appropriate for any delegation of power to the President in the particular domain of
foreign relations. The President’s interpretation must not, of course, plainly violate the
law; if it did, it would be struck down under Step One. But insofar as the law is unclear,
reasonable interpretations deserve respect.
We can approach this question from a different direction. As we have seen,
Chevron is based on a recognition that the interpretation of ambiguous terms depends not
on purely legal expertise, but also on judgments about both fact and value.191 Where
Congress has not spoken, interpretations must depend, at least in part, on assessments of
the consequences of one or another approach; agencies are in a comparatively good
position to make such assessments. And where questions of value are at stake, agencies,
subject as they are to presidential control,192 should resolve those questions as they deem
most sensible. We have seen that Chevron is based on a legal fiction193 about
congressional instructions with respect to interpretive power—a fiction that is rooted in
entirely sensible judgments, pragmatic in character, about institutional capacities. And if
these are the foundations for Chevron, then the question here is straightforward: the
189
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President should be taken to have the authority to interpret ambiguities as he chooses.
Interpretation of an authorization to use force, at least as much as any delegation of
authority to agencies, calls for appreciation of consequences and for complex judgments
of value. For the AUMF, the best reconstruction of congressional will is that ambiguities
are subject to presidential interpretation.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi does not speak in these terms, but its
conclusion is broadly consistent with them, and we think that our approach is preferable
to the one taken by the Court.194 The plurality accepted the executive’s claim that the
AUMF granted it the power to detain Hamdi, notwithstanding the Nondetention Act,
which forbids the executive to imprison or detain a citizen of the United States without
congressional authorization.195 The AUMF is quite general, and under standard principles
of statutory interpretation, it should arguably yield to the prior, relatively specific
Nondetention Act, which was intended to apply during wartime. However, the plurality
argued that the AUMF clearly authorized the executive to detain enemy combatants, and
thus satisfied the Nondetention Act.196 The plurality also noted that the AUMF may
implicitly incorporate principles of international law, but that these principles did not
forbid detention of enemy combatants.197 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
argued, not implausibly, that the AUMF was simply too vague to provide the kind of
clear authorization required by the Nondetention Act for detention of an American
citizen.198 He also suggested that the AUMF did not authorize the executive to violate
international law and the detentions did violate (or may have violated) international
law.199
We believe that even if Justice Souter was correct to say that the AUMF was
ambiguous rather than clear, the government should have prevailed on its claim that it
had the authority to detain enemy combatants. If the AUMF was ambiguous, the
executive should have had discretion to interpret it in a reasonable fashion, and it is
surely reasonable to conclude that a statute that authorizes the use of force authorizes
detention. Further, even if both opinions were correct in saying that the AUMF implicitly
incorporated international law, the government should have prevailed. Because the
executive has primacy in the interpretation of international law, its not-unreasonable
interpretation that the detentions complied with international law should control. Indeed,
the executive should be permitted to violate international law if its interpretation is
reasonable and if the statute is genuinely ambiguous. Less controversially, our approach
would permit courts, in future disputes about the scope of the AUMF, to resolve these
disputes by deferring to reasonable executive interpretations of the AUMF and
international law (if the AUMF incorporates international law).
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The difference between our approach and that of the plurality can be seen by
imagining that active hostilities in Afghanistan cease but the U.S. refuses to release the
detainees because they continue to pose a terrorist threat. The plurality refused to address
this issue but implied that the detention would be unlawful:
Further, we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and
appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war
principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.200
The court seems to say that the AUMF implicitly incorporates international law as a
constraint on executive action, or perhaps that its application to the hypothetical case is
ambiguous and so the Charming Betsy canon should be applied.201 In any event, the
court’s interpretation of international law would resolve the issue. We think the better
approach is to acknowledge the President’s authority to interpret the statute in a
reasonable fashion, regardless of whether that interpretation results in a violation of
international law. Thus, the President would decide whether the AUMF permits him to
detain enemy combatants after active hostilities end but the threat identified in the AUMF
continues, and the court would defer to a reasonable decision.
Nothing said here suggests that the President’s interpretive power is unlimited.
Any effort to interpret the AUMF, or any other statute dealing with terror, must contend
with Chevron Steps One and Two, and hence must count as a reasonable construction of
ambiguous terms. There are other limitations. Suppose, for example, that the President
make a plausible claim of statutory authority to engage in actions that threaten
constitutionally sensitive interests. As we have seen, statutes are generally not construed
to threaten such interests, even under Chevron. What is the role of the Avoidance Canon
in the face of executive interpretation? In our view, constitutionally sensitive rights
should probably have a kind of interpretive priority. It follows that when canons collide,
liberty generally receives the benefit of the doubt.202 Of course any interpretive canon is
subject to legislative override.
Conclusion

200

Id. at 521.
See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. Law Rev. 293 (2005); cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra (arguing that the AUMF
should be interpreted in light of history and international law but that it cannot be construed as forbidding
the executive to violate international law).
202
We do not address the question whether this proposition holds during emergencies, including the
emergency that produced the AUMF. Compare Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance
(forthcoming 2006) (arguing that courts should defer to executive during emergencies) and Cass R.
Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of clear
congressional authorization).
201

43

In this Article, we have attempted to understand the international relations
doctrines and to explore the role of the executive of interpreting ambiguous statutes that
might be taken to be inconsistent with those doctrines. In our view, the doctrines reflect
not a concern about entanglement alone, but a rough consequentialist judgment on the
part of the federal courts, to the effect that the risks to American interests outweigh the
potential benefits. Courts believe, for example, that a violation of international law is not
likely to be in the interest of the United States, and hence ambiguous statutes are not
construed to produce violations or international law. The same assessment underlies the
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. It is for this reason that
clear congressional authorization is required to threaten international comity.
The obvious problem is that courts are not institutionally well-equipped to make
the relevant judgments. When the governing statute is vague or ambiguous, there is no
sufficient reason to forbid the executive to balance the underlying interests as it chooses.
By virtue of its knowledge and accountability, the executive is in the best position to
make the appropriate consequentialist judgments – to assess the risks to American
interests, and the value of importance of (say) applying environmental and civil rights
statutes outside of the nation’s borders. As a matter of constitutional structure, moreover,
the President has a distinctive role in this domain. It follows that courts should defer to
executive interpretations of ambiguous enactments. Deference of this kind would greatly
simplify the relevant inquiries; it would also ensure that the relevant judgments are made
by those who are best suited to make them.
If this approach were adopted, the executive would have greater power to
interpret statutory ambiguities in the domain of foreign affairs. The most serious
objection to this result is that it would result in an undue concentration of power in the
executive branch. There are three responses to this objection. The first is that nothing said
here excludes the possibility that Congress is entitled to the last word; and there can be no
question that most of the time, clear legislation is controlling. The second response is that
a grant of authority to the executive may well result in a more expansive use of rightsprotecting provisions in American law; recall that under our approach, the executive is
permitted to apply the antidiscrimination laws to American companies operating abroad.
The third response is that other canons of interpretation, most notably constitutional
avoidance, operate as a check on executive authority. With these qualifications, the grant
of interpretive discretion to the executive emerges, not as an undue concentration of
authority, but as a sensible recognition of the inevitable role of judgments of policy and
principle in resolving statutory ambiguities, and of the advantages of ensuring that those
judgments are made by those who have relevant information and democratic
accountability.
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